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By Hanoch Dagan
and James J.White

C

itizens suc industries for tort injurlc5. That is familiar.

throughout that consumers o r thlrtl partics ha\.(, actuallv Iwcn

Go\w-nnients sue the same intlustrics for co\t suffcretl in

harmcd 131. the protlucts at ~ \ \ u c I>c
, it cigarcttc\, guns, ctc.,

amcliorating o r preventing those injuries. That is unfamiliar.

esplol-c thc intricatc Icgal qucst~onsariqing from the

the go\crnrncnt in competition \vitIi its citi7c-n~.It also

triangular relationship among tlic' plavcrs in thcsc high-profilc

facilitate\ the go\.crnment's fulfillment ot'its public

cases: go~.ernment.;,c ~ t i ~ c nanrl
s , clcfcntlant industries. We

responsibility. This article deals \\.ith thcsc iccs and ~ i r t u e s .

have t\tro major put-poscq: iclcntifying the PI-opcr causc of

T h e tohacco litigation by the .;tat?? and the scttlcnient of
that litigation (thc largc\t ct.cr) is thc most prominent

action of go17crnnicnti again\t industries and setting thcir
appropriatc hountlarics; ant1 cli\cu.;\ing tlic inherent ri\k\ in

example of this pattcrn of g o ~ ~ e r n m c suing
nt
injurious

allowing such clainis and pointing t o the way they \houltl 1c,

indu\trics. A similar pattcrn i \ de\ eloping in the gun intlustr!.

adtlresscd.

11,hcrc m o r e than 20 \uits h a w hecn brought against the

Wc begin \\.ith the quc\tion o f thc lialility of an injurious

manufacturer.;. Intlustries vraiting in the \ving\ for this

industr!, t o a gn\.crnmcnt that ha.; incurrcd prc\.critati\.c and

treatment inclu<le lead paint makers, ancl perhap\ e l en

anieliorativc costs duc t o thc harm.; inflictvtl I>!.

l>re\\.crs,tlistillcrs, anti procluccrs of fattv foorls.

on its c i t i ~ e n sThc
.
statci' litigation against th(. tohacco

In this article 11.c adrlrei\ \omc of thc que\tion\ raisc(l

I7y

this rcccnt pattcrn of litigation and settlement. Wc ascumc
72

and ha1.e valid claims against thc pcrtrncnt intlustr~.We

This nc\Ir pattern of litiption ancl scttlcnient inllcrcntl~.puts

1
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that industl-!,

industry focusccl on reimhurscnicnt of tolxicco-rclatctl
healthcarc costs. Many of thc causcs of action actuall~.

-ougIit I)!

tlic stat(..; \\,cbrcL
i l ~ \ . , i l i ( l I~a.;cso n \\,liicli t o m,ikc

protection against competition. J<c>gartl~nq
the hankruptc!.

predict that tlic wttlc.nicnt has intlircctl!. purchasc(l

.;uc~Iic.laini.;.l'hc state..;' cornl~laints(lit1 not aclcquatc-I\ prcwnt

i\\uc, \ \ c

tlicxir true ri.mc*(I\.:.;r~l>rocation.

the allcgiancc of its I,cncticiaric\, not on]!. [\tatel attorney5

Sul)rogation arise*.; \\,herc nnc pcrsr)n (the .;ulv-ogcc) pa\.<

gcncral, I>ut al\o pul>lic cmplovcc\, contractor\, c \ c n

,inotlic.r (tlic sul,rogor) t o co\.cr a lo.;.; o r a clcal>t for j3.hic.h a

t~ac.lic~r4'
union,. ,411 of tlic\c 1,cncficiaries no\\. ha\-e a I-eason

tliil-tl 1>.irt!,

to cupl>oi-t fc-clc.1-a1 Icgi\lation, likc the McCain Bill, that

i4

prirnaril\, li,iI>lc.The sul)i-ogc.c. then c.nl;)rc.c\ th(b

liability. C i t i ~ c n 4thu\

riglit.; o f tlic .;ul>rogor itgainst that tliir(l party (the party

\\oulcl cap tol>acco companies'

I>i-irnaril\.rc~uponsil>lcfor the 10s.;) f;)r it.; m1.n 1~c.ncl'it.

fnr thc go\ (-rnmc'nts' \!-innings through rerlucerl

hclp pa!

Sii1~1-ogation
has t\\.o (;)rm.;: c-ontractual (also callc(l

opportunitic,\ t o pur4uc thcir pri\.ate claims against thc

cr)n\~c~ntional)
ant1 Icgal (also callrtl ccluital~lc).O u r hcu.; is

injurioi14 indu,tl-ics. Inclir-cc-t e\.idcncc for thc same

on cases \\.hcrc therex arc n o contractual arl-angcnicnts

phcnomc.non is thc receipt h\. a go\.crnment of funds in

(explicit o r implicit) rcslxx-ting .;ul>rogation.

cxccss of qpcnt costs ant1 the spcnding of such funds o n

O u r analysis slio\\*stliat thc states ha\-e a \valitl ~uhrogation
claim. To hc surc, tlicirs is a liarcl case hccausc

-

unlikc core

case.; of sulwogation (such as tratlitional insurancc
sulJrogation)

-

cauws that

nothing t o d o \!~itIi the injured citi-/en\'

intcrc<tc.
Tlicsc clangcrs,

the intcrc..;ts of the go\.crnmcnts and thosc of'

tlic inclustrics arc not close-I\ lockctl-in together:

\\

liich are inliercnt in allo\\.ing

go\.ci-nmcnts t o sue injurious inclustrics for thcir prcvcntivc
ant1 anicliorativc costs, can, and slioultl he, aclclrcssecl in thc

regarding a

go\.crnmcnts, pavmcnt.; arc intiircct and to somc cxtcnt

fi-anic\\oi-k of takinys la\\: Thc takings question

t l i s ~ r ~ t i o n a rAnd
v . yc.t, likc in othcl- suhi-ogation hortlcrlinc

triangulal- paradigm a n a l o p u s t o our.;

cases, tliircl-pal-t\. intcrcst.; slioultl makc. rcco\.cr\-a\.ailal)lc:

go\ crnnicnt'4 settlement 11-ithanother so\.ercign limits a

puldic authorities shoultl I)c alJlc to rc.;pon<l in an cfficicnt

citi/cn<' claini c~gain4ttliat so\ creign

manncr to any threat t o tlic pulJlic licaltli o r safct!., \\.ithout

\\.err-ving t-hat tlic pro\.ision of scr\.iccs \\*auld insulate thosc
\\.ho arc rcsponsihlc from thcsc tlircats from liahilit\- and
unjustifial4v shift the I~urclcnof thcir \r.ronycloing t o the

- \\

here the

- is

unscttlcd. Ia'hile
Regon (4-53 U.S.654
119s 1 1) Icf't open a4 unripe tlic qucstion of \ \ liether such a
ccrtlcnicnt con4titutctl a taking, Justice Po\\.cll noted in
concut-rcnCcthat "[t]he go\ crntncnt must pa\- just
the Cuprcnic Cnurt in Domcc & llloorc

I,

pul~licpursc.
Thc go\.crnments' status as su1)rogccs makcs thcir riglits
cIc~-i~ati\.c
of those o f tlic direct \.ictims, due to and t o the
cstcnt of thc unsolicitctl hcnct'its c-onfcrrccl. ,4s such, the

Our analysis of the settlement

sul~rogcc'srights can IT

concludes that some of the auid

110

grcatcr than the rights of the

suhrogor. Thus, tlic. intlustrv's original lial~ilitvt o injured

pro quo given

citi-/cns caps it.; csl)o.;urc t o subi-ogation. Thc go\-crnmcnt.;

by

the states to the

tobacco manufacturers

arc also sul~jcctt o \\.hatcx\.cr (Icfc~iscstlic intlustrv \\.auld lia\.c
had against tlic injurcd citi7cns, niost promincntlv assuiiiption

k

of risk, causation, and statutes of liniitations. ,\lnrcn\.c.r,

is actuallv

at the expense o! third parties:

go\.cr-nmcnts arc\ cntitlcd only to the tlaniagcs attril)utal~lct o

competitors (and hence f u r u r ~

tlic loss \\.hicli tlic!. ha\-c co\-crctl (a~iclthe!. c'i~-r\.tlic Ilurdcn

consumers) and injured smol<ers. In

oI' pi.oviris that tlicsc costs \vcrc intlccd incul-rctl in a \\-a\.tliat

particular, we show tha.t the

hcncfit.; tlic iniurcxtl c-itiycns). Gn\.c.rnnicnts arc n o t cntitlcd

tobacco settlement secured two

t i ) clamages foi- pail1 and rllt'lki-ing, poniti\-c r l ~ r n a ~01-~ s ,

stcitutoi-\penaltic.; to \\.liich the' injui-ctl citi7cns might )la\-c

things for the tobacco comoanies:

~ C C I Icntitlc(1

at least momentary safety from

ti-om thC in(1ust1-ics.

banltruptcy and protection ayinst

Citizens vs. Governments: Takings

competition.

Go\crnmcntc tliat svc\k t o rce-o\ c'r tlicir ;mii.l~ol-atl\
c
and pl-c\ cnti\ c cmt4 might cnd up Iix-ming c itllcns I\ 110 4cck
~ - c ~ i i (['or~ l tlicir.
\
(11rc~c.t
claiiiascs. This ~ ~ r o p o . ; i t ~can
on
clcmon\t~.atcrlI)\ the tol~acc'oscttlcmc*nt.O u r anal\ 4 i 4 of the
~cttlciiicritc o ~ i c - l ~ i (tli,it
l c ~ .;oiiic
~
oI' tlic, 1,11111
pro

gi\ c11I>\

~ [ I Q

romlxiication

\\-hex11

it ful.thcl-\ thc nation', forrip1 polic\

tlic state4 to tlic toI~ac.comariu~ac.tul-el--4
is a c t ~ ~ latl \tlic

goal.; I n using a4 'bargaining c-hips' claims la\\ hill\ held 1~ a

cupcnsc ofthii.tl p ~ i - t i c compc~titors
s
(and hciicc~tilturc

~-cl,iti\
el\ I;'\\

coii\umcl-s) antl itilurcel 4rnokcl-s.

coui-14." I.o\\.cr cour1\ havr follo\\ rrl thi.; prol>orition h\

It1

particular, \vc sllt,\~ that

t l i ~toI>dcc-oscttl~liiciit.;CCUI.C~ t \ \ o tlliiig.;
the tol>acco
colnlxinic.. at lcact iiiomcntar\r safct\ fi-om I ) a l l k ~ - u ~ tant1
c\

l)cxi-so~is
an(] .;ul>jcctt o thc juri4clic-tion of o u r

scriiti~ii/iiiglhc co~irtittltiondlit\of siic.11 go\ c r ~ i ~ ~ i ~ l i t ~ l
intc-I-fcl-cncc.
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By exploring the foundations of takings lawv, we sho\rr that
a government's interference with its citizens' compensatory
claims beyond its role as a legitimate subrogee (via its receipt
of more money than it has spent on preventative and
ameliorative measures and/or the enactment of caps) justifies
compensation. In other \vords, insofar as the citi~en's
expected awards are compensator): and the government
spends the money it receives from the industry on programs
that do not benefit the injured citizens, the citizen's takings
claim should be successful. Governmental interferences with
citizens' punitive damages awards present a more complex
case. The case of barring punitive damages as part of a
qovernment-industry settlement derives complexity from the
unsettled nature of punitive damages. We doubt that citizens
can claim any entitlement for punitive damages for
retribution. But insofar as punitive damages are aimed at
deterring the defendant's infringement of the plaintiff's
entitlement, thus vindicating the latter's control over the
infringed resource, plaintiffs may well have valid tahngs
claims even respecting punitive damage. As long as punitive
damages for deterrence \\rill not be disentangled from
punitix-e damages for retribution, these claims would
probably remain theoretical. On the other hand, we have no
doubt that governmental interference with citizens'
compensatory awards should be regarded as a violation of

Our principal quarrel with the
settlement as an agreed
resolution of a tort claim is that
some of the terms - reducing
payments by the participating
manufacturers if they lose market
share to outsiders and inviting
the states to enact a tax that
deters new market entrants improperly redistribute costs from
the tobacco companies'
shareholders to their consumers.

their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A strict takings
doctrine is the only viable protection for citizens from the
dangers inhcrcnt in governmental interfercnce with their
claims against injurious industries.
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Public Policy
Such findings have significant impact on the formation and
conduct of public policy. There is considerable risk that
g;overnmental interfercnce in the resolution of mass tort
claims will violate the legal rights of the individual victims.
Our case study of thc tobacco scttlemcnt highlights an
additional disadvantage, that such intcrfcrence is also bad
public policy even where it might not violate the legal rights
of the individual victims. This is true whether one considers
the settlement to be merely an agreed resolution of a tort
subrogation claim or a state imposed tax.
We acknowledge that the states are proper subrogees fcr
their ameliorative and preventative costs and M'C also see no
reason why their claim for those costs could not be resolved
by agreement with the manufacturers. But the settlement is
unlike a garden-variety subrogation recovery; as true
subrogees, the states \vould surely not have \Iron judLgments
with a value equal to the amount that the tobacco
manufacturers have agreed to pay. The states reached such a
favorable settlement only by colluding with the tobacco
manufacturers to put a disproportionate share of the cost on
their citizen smokers.
Our principal quarrel with the settlement as an agreed
resolution of a tort claim is that some of the terms reducing payments by the participating manufacturers if they
lose market share to outsiders and inviting the states to enact
a tax that deters new market entrants - improperly
redistribute costs from the tobacco companies' shareholders
to their consumers. If the agreements in the settlement had
been reached between private parties, they would have
violated federal antitrust laws. Although states' agreements
are immune from federal antitrust prosecution, the
anticompetitive provisions of the settlement will have exactly
the same effect as if private parties had conspired to exclude
competitors. If the agreement with the manufacturers hinders
the entry of new competitors, the price of cigarettes will be
hgher than in a freely competitive market.
The higher price has two effects. First, it frees the
companies' shareholders from having to intcrnalize the costs
of their tort liability; they can pass on the costs to consumers
without a loss in market share. Second, it facilitates the
inclusion of additional payments in the settlement (c.g.
payments for lobbying) without fear that new entrants to thc
market will undercut the cigarctte prices of the participating
manufacturcrs. If dcmand for cigarettes is relatively inelastic,
if price competition among the participating manufacturcrs is
muted, and if outsiders are barred, the cost of any "bribe" to
the state governments can be passed through to purchasers
\vithout cost to the manufacturers.
The settlement may be even more offcnsive to public
policy if it is considcred to he a tax imposed hy quasi-judicial
function. The payments haw many of the attributes of a tax:
they are made to the states; continuc indefinitely; are only
imperfectly rclated to past tort injuries; and in many states

nc incentive of s

\v~llgo dlrcctly into thc trcasury ant1 he expentled In just the

regard tncse Denerlrs as an cnrrrlemenr.

4amc way as conventional tax revcnucs woultl be. As a tax,

officials t o maintain the revenues \trill be correspondingly

thc \cttlcmcnt is unc.lcmocratic ant1 rcgrcssive.

enhanced by the kno\vledge that particular, local voters
depend o n this revenue.

Thc first ant1 most po\z.crful ohjcct~onis that as a tax the
scttlcment violatcs tlic tlcmocratic principlcs that are built

I

~

c

We see much that is bad and little that is good from

into thc tax laws of cvcrv state. If a state were t o enact a

enacting such a tax by a quasi-judicial process. T h e absence of

multi-billion dollar tax equal t o thc rcvcnucs that it will

the legislature from the adoption process stills the public's

rcccivc under thc scttlemcnt, it \voulcl have t o follo\v
c.lahoratc Icgislative proccdurcs. Typically, these measures

voice and facilitates collusiye bargains. Characterizing the
payments as t o r t recoveries frees public officials from the

woultl inclu<lc lcgislativc hearings, dcbate, and passage by

pain that they would suffer for enacting new taxes,

both houscs of thc state legislature, and signature by the

particularly regressive ones. Finally, the exclusion of smokers

govcrnor. In contrast, a state's adoption of thc settlement

from the private bargaining table facilitates other parties

rcquircd only the agrecmcnt of a state official such as the

taking assets that should belong t o the excluded players.

attorney gcneral and the atloption of the scttlement in a
judLgment dismissing the state's suit against the
manufacturers. The scttlemcnt's b y a s s i n g of the traditional

mechanisms for the passage of new taxes reduces the visibility
of the settlement's provisions. N o advocate for cigarette

Because the settlemen! revenlues

consumers has ever had the opportunity t o express the

to identifiable hen^3ciaries
in most states, Dersons in evPrv

arguments that we consider here. N o attorney general has

a00

had t o respond to questions about the settlement's
anticompetitive provisions. N o anti-tax governor has had t o

state will shortlv reyard these

explain \vhy hc o r she is proposing a huge new tax.

t.
benefits as an e n t i t j ~ m ~ r rTcle

The lack of public participation becomes even more
troubling when we consider that in modern America smokers

incentive of state officials to

are drawn disproportionately from classes u-ith limited

maintain the revenues ~ i l lh~

education and low incomes. The tobacco manufacturers'

correspond in^!^

ability to pass o n the costs of the settlement means that the
costs will be imposed primarily on n-orking-class smokers.
This concern \vould be alle~.iatedif a disproportion at el^ large
share of the tax revenues lvere t o g o t o the working class,
particularly t o the smokcrs, but we see n o evidence of that

>:

en'lavcec' bv +be

Itnowledqe that particular, loczl
voters depend on this revenue.

happening.
Consider one final consequence of this unusual tax. Every
excise tax o n a potentially injurious product is, of course, a
bargain with the devil, for niore sales mean both more tax
revcnue and niore injurics. But the peculiar nature of this tax
ties thc states even m o r c closelv t o current memhers of the
tohacco industry than would be true of a conventional tax.
Because thc tax ariscs from an agreement betlvccn each statc
and spccific tobacco manufacturcrs, tlic tax revcnues depend
upon the continucd csistence and sol\.cncy of thc
participating manufacturers. If Philip Morris o r RJR goes into
bankruptcy and liquidates, and its market share is taken over
hy a new entrant, cvcrjr state's tax revenues will declinc
accordinglv. Each state will thus have an iticcntive t o lcccp
tliesc particular taxpa~lerslicalthy. If o u r analysis is correct,
the statcs havc made covcrt, implied promises ahout lobbying
and covert, exprcss protniscs about crccting harriers t o new
entrants that tlic statcs \vould probal3ly not make t o anyone
openlv, certainly not t o specific ~ n c l n h c r sof a particular
industry.
Rccausc the settlement rcvcnucs go to identifiable

Conclusions
We d o not claim that every bargain struck in settlement of
a state o r federal suit against weapons manufacturers, sellers
of fatty foods, bre\vers, o r distillers will have all of the same
characteristics as the tobacco scttlement. But \ve believe that
when the government asserts a claim that could be asserted

b~ an individual citizen, it will almost ahvays be presented
lvith the same temptation t o collusion and convcrsion. T h e
industry under attack will always want protection frc)n~the
private suits that may b e its only hope for survival. Invariablv,
thereforc, these industries \\-ill seek palnient out of the
I-esources of the individual plaintiffs. Because thcse bargains
are negotiations for the settlement o r suits t o which, by
hypothesis, the individuals are not parties, the individual
plaintiffs will be excluded. Rut

. . . government interference

is also beneficial, for it allolvs governments t o pursuc their

l~eneficiaricsin most statcs, persons in evcrv state will shortlv
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p1113Iic rc.sl>o~i~~\>ilitic~*
ill p r c ~
cnting atid a ~ l i c l i o ~ - ~ l it in~j l~g~ r i c \

,4.; \\c\ (-laim tIirc)ughout, go\crnmc,nt'4 Icagal 4ul)rogation

t o tlicir c i t ~ / c n \\I i t l i o ~ I~c t, c ~ ~t -l ~ i tlic>
t l>ul>lic\\ i l l 1)c.ar IIIOI-c

cIa11ii4'II-C- I~otli\ a l u t ~ r \,11i(1tla11gc.r-ou\.O n l ~
a gc.nvl-0114

than it4 fair stiarc ot'thc c 0 4 t PI-operlra\\t%t-tccl.
go\*rrnnlcnt

al)l>roacIi t o sul>rogation ac.coriil,an~c~tII)\ ,I 4tric.t tak111g4

1 ~ ' g w~ hl r o g a t i o ~cl~lliii;
~
in\ul-c. thc c c ~ r r c intcrnalilation
~t
ol'

inrluir\*can c,al>tu~-c
the' ad\ antage'\ ol'go\ c.rnmc.lit

thc 11-uc costs ot' an indu.;tr\.'c products.

inyo11 c'rnc'nt

thc L a \ - School mtl

,I

\\

itliout opening thc. tlool. t o al3usc..

prc>l.c*.;,c-)r,it Tcl-.\\.i\ Llni\-csr<it\.1.,1\\

Sc-hnol in Israc-I. Prolc.;sot- Day.111 rccci\-ctl Iiis LL.Z.1. am1 J.S.1)
frc-)m'lhlcLa\\- Schnol al'tvr rce-c.i\-in~
h i < LL.R., qrrnlrnd irlnj
l a u ~ l c ,from Tcl .4\.i\-Uni\-c,rsit\.. Hc i s I\-itlc.11- l>ul~li.;lictl
in l>c,th

Enqli.;li ant1 FIcl)rc,\\-o n pri\.atc. la\\. tlicor\., tnkiny la\\-,
cli.;tt-il)uti\.cnjustices, and ~x-ol>u-t\.
thco~-\.,
an(] lic is often iri\.itccl
tcs :i\cb Ivc.turcx\ 2nd prvwntation4 in hi.; area4 nf intct-c4t. IIc
\\.rotcs Ilnlrlct E n r i i h n 1 ~ - n r : l. .\'tirJ\
(

~ 7 f

Prrr .7rs

1 ~ 7 1 , a. n J fi1l9llc I;llrrci

Canil>riilqc Uni\-emit\. I't-c>zs)and is cclitor of' I ' ~ n ~ !Larr In Iqrocl:

Rctlr.ccn Prjr.gtc CinJ l'lfhl,i (in Hchre\\-).Sc-1n1c of hi4 m o w I-c.~.cnt

artic-lr.; arc.: ".\Ii~tal.:c~s,"
79 T;'\.c7< L c i ~RCl~ lcli 1 74 5 ( -70C)
1 1; "The,
Lil-,c:ral Commons" (\\-it11.\licliacl F l c l l c ~ )1 1 0 1;71c- I i 1 1 1 . /('i1rn~71

54s ( ? O n 1 ); ant1 "Just C'o~npcn,~itic)n,Inccnti\.v.;, ancl Soc.i~I
lle.anin;s,"

I l l i h ~ ~ ~Lc711.
c ~ nR C I1c-11 1 34 (2000).I_Ic* ha4 t , i u ~ l i t
c-c-,ui-w.;an(\ scminar-.; at the, La\\ 5chool o n propc,~-t\.
la\\.,

iu~-i,pru(lcncc....4mcrican Iclga1 tl7cnr\., l-,rol,c;l-t\-thvr)r\., Icg,il
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